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Abstract—Flow untraceability is one critical requirement for
anonymous communication with network coding, which prevents
malicious attackers with wiretapping and traffic analysis abilities
from relating the senders to the receivers, using linear dependency
of the received packets. There have recently been proposals
advocating encryptions on the Global Encoding Vectors (GEV)
of network coding to thwart such attacks [1], [2]. Nevertheless,
there has been no exploration of the capability of networking
coding itself, to constitute more efficient and effective algorithms
which guarantee anonymity. In this paper, we design a novel,
simple, and effective linear network coding mechanism (ALNCode)
to achieve flow untraceability in a communication network with
multiple unicast flows. With solid theoretical analysis, we first
show that linear network coding (LNC) can be applied to thwart
traffic analysis attacks without the need of encrypting GEVs. Our
key idea is to mix multiple flows at their intersection nodes by
generating downstream GEVs from the common basis of upstream
GEVs belonging to multiple flows, in order to hide the correlation
of upstream and downstream GEVs in each flow. We then design
a deterministic LNC scheme to implement our idea, by which
the downstream GEVs produced are guaranteed to obfuscate
their correlation with the corresponding upstream GEVs. We also
give extensive theoretical analysis on the intersection probability
of GEV bases and the influential factors to the effectiveness of
our scheme, as well as the algorithm complexity to support its
efficiency.
I. INTRODUCTION
Following its success in maximizing network throughput
[3]–[5], network coding has recently been shown to provide
information security in a content distribution network, against
active entropy and Byzantine modification attacks, as well
as passive wiretapping attacks. To battle active attacks where
malicious attackers can alter message content, secure network
coding schemes have been proposed to guarantee integrity
of the transmitted data in the network, based on the error
correction and detection capabilities of network coding [6]–
[8]. In face of passive wiretappers which may eavesdrop on
the links to acquire transmitted information, network coding can
naturally and effectively provide confidentiality of the messages
as long as the attacker cannot obtain sufficient numbers of
linearly independent coded messages [9]–[11].
In this paper, we consider how to use network coding to
achieve anonymity, another key aspect of secure data commu-
nication, by which the identities of the sender and the receiver
of a unicast flow, as well as the path traversed, are desirably
hidden from wiretappers with traffic analysis abilities.
Flow untraceability has become increasingly important in
today’s Internet with more and more users resuming both roles
of a content supplier and a content consumer. In online social
networks such as Facebook and Twitter, friends exchanging
private messages or contents may not want others to know;
In a peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing system, anonymous P2P
communication is desired to share copyrighted files without
revealing one’s identity and risking litigation, as well as to
prevent tracking or data mining activities from spammers.
To provide flow untraceability against traffic analysis attacks,
traditional approaches without network coding choose from the
following approaches [12]–[16]: (1) hide the content correlation
among messages with encryption, (2) hide the size correlation
of messages by padding with random symbols, (3) hide the
time correlation among messages of the same flow by mixing
the order of message transmissions from different flows at in-
termediate nodes, as well as (4) protect the routing information
using secure routing protocols [15]–[17].
Linear network coding (LNC) has been promising to achieve
the same objectives with much better efficiency: it naturally
conceals content correlation of messages in the same flow,
instead of using computationally expensive encryption and
decryption for each message at each intermediate node; coded
messages have an equal size and are buffered at intermediate
nodes to generate new coded messages, naturally preventing
correlating message sizes and arrival time patterns.
In LNC, each coded message in the network corresponds
to a Global Encoding Vector (GEV), which consists of the
coding coefficients it is produced with, with respect to the set
of original messages. Given the encoding mechanisms of LNC,
linear dependency among GEVs of coded messages may reveal
information of the flow path, if the wiretapper analyzes the
correlation between coded messages in the upstream and those
in the downstream. Therefore, if a secure anonymous routing
protocol is in place to hide the routing information, the key
challenge of applying LNC for anonymous communication is
to hide the correlation among GEVs.
A natural solution is to use encryption. Fan et al. [1] and
Zhang et al. [2] propose to share a secret key between the
source and the destination, apply an encryption function which
allows intermediate nodes to produce new encrypted GEVs
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Fig. 1. ALNCode design: an example.
without knowing the secret key, and then let the destination
decrypt received GEVs with the pre-shared secret key. To
implement such an encryption/decryption scheme, a Trust Au-
thority (TA) or Key Distribution Center (KDC) is needed to
distribute the secrete key to the source and the destination
before the flow starts. In networks with large numbers of unicast
flows, this approach may not scale well.
Can anonymous communication be provided in a more
scalable, efficient, but effective fashion without intensive en-
cryptions at all? This paper provides a “yes” answer, by
exploring the power of LNC itself. We design a novel, simple,
and effective Anonymous Linear Network Coding mechanism,
referred to as ALNCode, which thwarts against traffic analysis
attacks in a communication network with multiple unicast
flows, without encrypting GEVs and sharing any secrete keys
among sources and destinations. Our key idea is to mix multiple
flows at their intersection nodes by generating downstream
GEVs from the common basis of upstream GEVs belonging
to multiple flows, in order to hide the correlation of upstream
and downstream GEVs of each flow.
An example in Fig. 1 illustrates the idea: In a network with
3 unicast flows from source si to destination di, i ∈ {1, 2, 3},
respectively, each flow may go through multiple paths in
the cloud and paths of different flows intersect at common
intermediate nodes. LNC is performed at each node among
messages of the same flow over finite field F2. Each flow has 4
original messages. Assume an intermediate node k receives 6
coded messages from 3 flows: two coded messages with GEVs
a = [1, 0, 1, 0] and b = [1, 1, 0, 1] from flow s1 → d1, two
coded messages with GEVs c = [0, 1, 1, 0] and d = [1, 0, 1, 1]
from flow s2 → d2, and the rest two with GEVs e = [1, 1, 1, 1]
and f = [0, 1, 0, 1] from flow s3 → d3. k can generate a new
coded message for flow s1 → d1 by xor-ing the two received
messages with GEVs a and b, and derive the new GEV as
g = a + b = [0, 1, 1, 1]. This new GEV is obfuscated, because
g = a + b = a + c + d = b + e + f = c + d + e + f , i.e., g
is not only correlated with {a,b}, but also {a, c,d}, {b, e, f},
and {c,d, e, f}. Therefore, to any traffic analysis attacker that
tries to correlate the upstream and downstream GEVs, it would
not be able to tell which messages belong to the same flow.
To the best of our knowledge, no previous work has aimed
to preserve flow untraceability with such obfuscated network
codes across multiple flows to hide GEV correlations. The main
contributions of the paper are summarized as follows:
⊲ We propose ALNcode, a light-weighted LNC mechanism
for flow untraceability in networks with multiple unicast
flows. We present solid theoretical analysis to support the
validity of our idea.
⊲ We design a deterministic LNC scheme to implement
ALNcode, by which the downstream GEVs produced are
guaranteed to obfuscate their correlation with the corre-
sponding upstream GEVs, under mild conditions.
⊲ We give extensive theoretical analysis on the intersection
probability of the GEV bases and the influential factors to
the effectiveness of our scheme, as well as the algorithm
complexity to support its efficiency. We also discuss how
our scheme can be practically applied to provide full-
fledged flow untraceability, in terms of the anonymity of
the source, the destination, as well as the paths of packets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We formally
present the models of network coding and wiretapping attacks,
as well as our anonymous communication objectives in Sec. II.
We present the key idea of ALNcode and the detailed deter-
ministic LNC design in Sec. III. Sec. IV gives our extensive
theoretical analysis on the effectiveness of our design and
Sec. V discusses how our mechanism can efficiently throttle
traffic analysis attacks. We discuss related work in Sec. VI and
conclude the paper in Sec. VII.
II. ANONYMOUS COMMUNICATION MODEL WITH LNC
In this section, we present the network and LNC model, the
traffic analysis attacks we consider, as well as the goals of
anonymous communication.
A. Network and Linear Network Coding Model
We consider a communication network with multiple unicast
flows between multiple pairs of source and destination nodes.
Each flow has a unique flow number and may go through
multiple paths; the paths of different flows may intersect at
common intermediate nodes (e.g., Fig. 1(a)). Linear network
coding (LNC) [18] is applied in the transmission of each unicast
flow: a source node partitions the data flow into messages of
the fixed size H , and every h consecutive messages in the flow
form a generation. LNC is performed among messages in the
same generation of a flow.
Source encoding: Given original messages {m1, · · · ,mh}
in generation j of flow i, the source node selects h linearly
independent GEVs, {v1, · · · ,vh}, over finite field Fhq , and
generates h coded messages {m′1, · · · ,m
′
h} using these GEVs.
The h coded messages are generated as follows, shown together
with the GEVs:[
vn m
′
n
]
=
[
vn
h∑
l=1
vn,lmn
]
, (1)
where 1 ≤ n ≤ h and vn,l is the lth element of vector vn.
Intermediate node encoding: Each intermediate node buffers
coded messages received for a generation of a flow for T time
slots, and produces new coded messages for this generation
from the buffered messages. Suppose the node has received
r coded messages {m′1, · · · ,m
′
r} for generation j of flow i
during time T , corresponding to r GEVs {v′1, · · · ,v
′
r}. To
generate a new coded message, it produces a local encoding1009
vector c = [c1, · · · , cr] from finite field Frq , and then generates
the new coded message m′′ together with a new GEV v′′ as:[
v′′ m′′
]
=
[
r∑
l=1
clv
′
l
r∑
l=1
clm
′
l
]
. (2)
Destination decoding: After receiving h coded messages
{m′′1 , · · · ,m
′′
h} from generation j of flow i with linearly
independent GEVs {v′′1 , · · · ,v
′′
h}, a destination node recovers
the original messages {m1, · · · ,mh} by inverting the matrix
composed by the GEVs: m1...
mh
 =
 v
′′
1
...
v′′h

−1  m
′′
1
...
m′′h
 . (3)
In a practical communication network, each coded message
to be delivered is tagged with its routing information, flow
number, generation number, and the GEV, which together is
referred to as a data packet. We assume all data packets in
the network have an equal size. We also assume that a secure,
anonymous routing protocol [15]–[17] is in place (similar to
the assumptions made in [1] and [2]). With such a secure,
anonymous routing protocol, the route of each flow from the
source to the destination is decided locally at each intermediate
node, who knows only the previous-hop and next-hop nodes
along the path. The routing information, flow and generation
numbers attached to each coded message is protected by
encryption with public/private keys generated locally by each
intermediate node and exchanged only among neighbors. On
the other hand, GEVs and message contents are not encrypted.
B. The Attack Model
We consider passive wiretapping attackers from outside of
the network with traffic analysis abilities. For such an outside
attacker, we assume it can observe all the packets along all the
links in the network and analyze them, attempting to identify
sources, destinations, and paths of the flows [1], [12]–[14]. For
each attacker, routing, flow, and generation information in each
data packet sniffed is hidden (by the secure, anonymous routing
protocol), but GEVs and coded messages are open.
C. The Anonymous Communication Goals
The flow untraceability objectives we aim to achieve in this
paper include:
⊲ Flow path anonymity. The attacker cannot deduce the
flow paths of each flow, i.e., if an attacker observes an
upstream packet and a downstream packet at a node, it
cannot distinguish whether they are in the same flow or
not.
⊲ Source and destination anonymity. The attacker cannot
determine which node each flow originates from or ter-
minates at, i.e., it is not able to tell which nodes in the
network (sources) are communicating with which other
nodes (destinations).
We summarize important notations in the paper for ease of
reference in Table I.
TABLE I
Symbol Definition
Fq a finite field of size q, where q is a prime number
h the number of messages in each generation of a flow
H the size of each message
Vi,j,k
the set of GEVs received by node k from generation j
of flow i in the past T time slots
V˜i,j,k
the set of GEVs received by node k from flows other
than i in the past T time slots
f1
the number of GEVs received by node k from genera-
tion j of flow i in the past T time slots
f2
the number of GEVs received by node k from flows
other than iin the past T time slots
F
the total number of GEVs received by node k from all
the flows and generations in the past T time slots
L(·)
linear span of a set of vectors. For a matrix B, L(B)
is the row vector space of B.
Symbol T transpose of a matrix or a vector
r1 dim(L(Vi,j,k))
r2 dim(L(V˜i,j,k))
R dim(L(
⋃
∀i,j Vi,j,k))
C
the matrix formed by nonzero vectors in the set of
vectors C as its rows
Ni,j,k the basis of vector space L(Vi,j,k) ∩ L(V˜i,j,k)
N N = |Ni,j,k| = dim(L(Vi,j,k) ∩ L(V˜i,j,k))
Θi,j,k
the obfuscated basis of L(Vi,j,k) which is the basis of
L(Vi,j,k) extended from Ni,j,k
III. ALNCode: ANONYMOUS LINEAR NETWORK CODING
AGAINST TRAFFIC ANALYSIS ATTACKS
We now present our Anonymous Linear Network Coding
(ALNCode) mechanism to provide flow untraceability. We first
present the general idea and then design a detailed deterministic
LNC scheme to achieve the objective.
A. The Basic Idea
The key idea in ALNCode is to produce new coded messages
with obfuscated GEVs at intermediate nodes, which are linearly
correlated not only with received GEVs from the same flow,
but also those from other flows. Fig. 2 gives an illustration:
Let Vi,j,k denote the set of GEVs of coded messages received
at intermediate node k from generation j of flow i in the past
T time slots, and L(Vi,j,k) be the linear span of these GEVs.
Let V˜i,j,k =
⋃
l 6=i,∀j Vl,j,k be the set of GEVs received at k
from flows other than i before and within the T time slots, and
L(V˜i,j,k) be its linear span.
Suppose Ni,j,k = {n1, · · · ,n|Ni,j,k|} denotes the basis of
vector space L(Vi,j,k) ∩ L(V˜i,j,k), Ni,j,k can be extended to
the basis of vector space L(Vi,j,k) (with methods described
in Sec. III-B), i.e., letting r1 = dim(L(Vi,j,k)), there exist
r1−|Ni,j,k| vectors, {δ1, · · · , δr1−|Ni,j,k|}, in L(Vi,j,k), such
that Θi,j,k = {n1, · · · ,n|Ni,j,k|, δ1, · · · , δr1−|Ni,j,k|} forms
the basis of L(Vi,j,k). We hereinafter refer to Θi,j,k as the
obfuscated basis of L(Vi,j,k).
To produce a new coded message for generation j of flow i,
we seek to generate a new GEV vi,j that is linear combination
of a and b, where vector a is generated from L(Vi,j,k) and
vector b is generated from L(Vi,j,k) ∩L(V˜i,j,k). In this way,
vi,j could have linear correlation with both GEVs in Vi,j,k
and V˜i,j,k. If an attacker attempts to trace back the source of
the coded packet with GEV vi,j , both the GEVs in Vi,j,k and1010
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Fig. 2. Obfuscated GEV production for generation j of flow i at intermediate
node k.
V˜i,j,k could be correlated with vi,j , and the attacker would fail
to identify which flow the packet actually belongs to.
How do we generate vi,j as the linear combination of vectors
in L(Vi,j,k) and L(Vi,j,k)∩L(V˜i,j,k), respectively? Let Θi,j,k
be the matrix formed by vectors in Θi,j,k as its rows, and
ρ = {ρ1, · · · , ρr1} be a vector in F
r1
q . Set vi,j = ρΘi,j,k =∑|Ni,j,k|
l=1 ρlnl +
∑r1
l=|Ni,j,k|+1
ρlδl−|Ni,j,k|. Then vi,j is linear
combination of vector b =
∑|Ni,j,k|
l=1 ρlnl from L(Vi,j,k) ∩
L(V˜i,j,k) and vector a =
r1∑
l=|Ni,j,k|+1
ρlδl−|Ni,j,k| from L(Vi,j,k).
Above we have provided one method to generate the GEV
vi,j which is potentially an obfuscated GEV, but not guaran-
teed. We next prove the sufficient and necessary condition that
an obfuscated new GEV does exist, and the sufficient condition
under which vi,j produced above is an obfuscated GEV.
Theorem 1: At intermediate node k, an obfuscated GEV
ui,j exists for generation j of flow i, iff dim(L(Vi,j,k) ∩
L(V˜i,j,k)) 6= 0.
Proof: We first prove the necessity of the condition. If
ui,j is a GEV generated by node k for generation j of flow
i, we have ui,j ∈ L(Vi,j,k). If ui,j is an obfuscated GEV,
ui,j is linearly correlated with both the GEVs in L(Vi,j,k)
and those in L(V˜i,j,k), i.e., there exist a ∈ L(Vi,j,k) and b ∈
L(V˜i,j,k) where b 6= 0, such that ui,j = a+b. Therefore, b =
ui,j − a ∈ L(Vi,j,k). Since we also have b ∈ L(V˜i,j,k), b ∈
L(Vi,j,k)∩L(V˜i,j,k). Thus, there exists this non-zero vector b
in L(Vi,j,k)∩L(V˜i,j,k), i.e., dim(L(Vi,j,k)∩L(V˜i,j,k)) 6= 0.
We next prove the sufficiency of the condition. If
dim(L(Vi,j,k)∩L(V˜i,j,k)) 6= 0, there exists a non-zero vector
b ∈ L(Vi,j,k)∩L(V˜i,j,k), and we can just set ui,j = b, which
is linearly correlated with both the GEVs in L(Vi,j,k) and those
in L(V˜i,j,k)). Thus the theorem is proved.
Theorem 2: When dim(L(Vi,j,k) ∩L(V˜i,j,k)) 6= 0, a GEV
vi,j generated by node k for generation j of flow i using the
above mentioned method, is an obfuscated GEV, if not all the
first |Ni,j,k| elements of ρ are zero.
Proof: Using the above mentioned method, we know
vi,j =
|Ni,j,k|∑
l=1
ρlnl +
r1∑
l=|Ni,j,k|+1
ρlδl−|Ni,j,k|.
Since each nl, 1 ≤ l ≤ |Ni,j,k|, is a vector in L(Vi,j,k) ∩
L(V˜i,j,k),
∑|Ni,j,k|
l=1 ρlnl is a linear combination of the vectors
in L(Vi,j,k) ∩ L(V˜i,j,k). Since not all the first |Ni,j,k| ele-
ments of ρ are zero and vectors n1, . . . ,n|Ni,j,k| are linearly
independent,
∑|Ni,j,k|
l1=1
ρl1nl1 is a non-zero vector. On the other
hand,
∑r1
l=|Ni,j,k|+1
ρlδl−|Ni,j,k| is a linear combination of the
vectors in L(Vi,j,k). Thus, GEV vi,j has linear correlation with
both GEVs in L(Vi,j,k) and those in L(V˜i,j,k)).
B. The Deterministic Linear Network Coding Scheme
Based on Theorems 1 and 2, we now design a detailed
LNC scheme, by which r1 new coded messages with linearly
independent obfuscated GEVs can be generated at each inter-
mediate node k, after it receives r1 linearly independent GEVs
in the past T time slots from generation j of flow i, as long as
dim(L(Vi,j,k) ∩ L(V˜i,j,k)) 6= 0 is satisfied.
The basic method proposed in the previous section shows
how to generate obfuscated GEVs: We obtain L(Vi,j,k) ∩
L(V˜i,j,k) from the received GEVs at node k from generation j
of flow i and other flows. We derive Ni,j,k, i.e., its basis, and
extend it to Θi,j,k, i.e., the basis of vector space L(Vi,j,k). We
then select vectors ρ ∈ Fr1q with the first |Ni,j,k| elements
not all zero and generate GEVs vi,j = ρΘi,j,k. We know
these GEVs are obfuscated GEVs (Theorem 2), but we need to
select different ρ’s, such that r1 linearly independent obfuscated
GEVs can be produced. We next detail these procedures, as well
as how local encoding vectors are formed at k to generate these
new GEVs from received GEVs.
1) Derive Θi,j,k
Let Λ = {α1, · · · ,αr1} be the maximum independent set
of Vi,j,k. Λ is the basis of L(Vi,j,k). Let Λ be the matrix
formed by vectors in Λ as its rows. Let Γ = {β1, · · · ,βr2}
be the maximum independent set of V˜i,j,k. Γ is the basis of
L(V˜i,j,k). We compute the basis of L(Vi,j,k)∩L(V˜i,j,k) from
Λ and Γ and extend it to the basis of L(Vi,j,k) following the
general method [19] to get the basis of the intersection of two
vector spaces and extend it to the basis of one vector space:
i) Construct a matrix A = {αT1 , · · · ,α
T
r1
,βT1 , · · · ,β
T
r2
}
with dimension h × (r1 + r2) and then reduce A to its row-
echelon form rref(A) by Gaussian elimination. Note that if
a row of rref(A) is non-zero, the first non-zero element of
this row is refereed to as the pivot of the row. A non-pivotal
column refers to a column no elements of which is a pivot.
ii) Let N be the number of non-pivotal columns of rref(A).
Then N = dim(L(Vi,j,k) ∩ L(V˜i,j,k)) [19]. We can ob-
tain N linear combinations
r1∑
l=1
an,lαl, 1 ≤ n ≤ N , where
[an,1, · · · , an,r1 , an,r1+1, · · · , an,h]
T is the nth non-pivotal
column of rref(A). These linear combinations form the basis
of L(Vi,j,k) ∩ L(V˜i,j,k), i.e., Ni,j,k, and N = |Ni,j,k|.
iii) To derive Θi,j,k, a basis of L(Vi,j,k) which contains
Ni,j,k, we first construct a h× (N + r1) dimensional matrix
Φ =
[
r1∑
l=1
a1,lα
T
l , · · · ,
r1∑
l=1
aN,lα
T
l , α
T
1 , · · · , α
T
r1
]
.
We know the basis of the column space of Φ can be derived as
follows: reduce Φ to its row-echelon form rref(Φ), and then1011
those column vectors in Φ, that correspond to the columns in
rref(Φ) containing pivots, form the basis. The column space
of Φ is indeed L(Ni,j,k∪Vi,j,k) = L(Vi,j,k), and thus we have
derived a basis of L(Vi,j,k). In addition, since the set of vectors
in Ni,j,k are linearly independent, all the column vectors in the
Ni,j,k part of Φ correspond to columns in rref(Φ) containing
pivots. Thus, the basis of L(Vi,j,k) derived above is composed
of all the vectors in Ni,j,k, as well as r1 −N other GEVs in
Vi,j,k, which we denote as {αL1 , · · · ,αLr1−N }. Θi,j,k, the
basis of L(Vi,j,k) which contains Ni,j,k, is thus derived as
{
r1∑
l=1
a1,lαl, · · · ,
r1∑
l=1
aN,lαl,αL1 , · · · ,αLr1−N }. (4)
2) Generate r1 linearly independent obfuscated GEVs
The vectors in Θi,j,k form the basis of L(Vi,j,k) and the first
N vectors in Θi,j,k are the basis of L(Vi,j,k) ∩ L(V˜i,j,k). In
general, to produce r1 linearly independent obfuscated GEVs,
we left-multiply Θi,j,k by a nonsingular matrix composed by
r1 linearly independent vectors from Fr1q , the first N elements
of each of which are not all zeros. We can select a nonsingular
lower triangular matrix C1 as follows:
C1 =

c1,1
c2,1 c2,2
0
...
...
. . .
cr1,1 cr1,2 · · · cr1,r1
 ,
where each ci′,j′ , 1 ≤ j
′ ≤ i′ ≤ r1 is randomly selected from
{1 · · · q − 1}. Since dim(L(Vi,j,k) ∩ L(V˜i,j,k)) 6= 0 and the
leading element of each row of C1 is non-zero, each row vector
of C1Θi,j,k is an obfuscated GEV; since matrix C1 has full
rank, these r1 obfuscated GEVs are linearly independent.
3) Construct local encoding vectors
Recall the intermediate node encoding model described in
Sec. II-A: after receiving coded messages corresponding to r1
linearly independent GEVs Λ = {α1, · · · ,αr1}, node k selects
r1 coding coefficients from Fr1q . Then according to this local
encoding vector, it does a linear combination of the r1 received
coded messages to produce a coded message, and also does a
linear combination of the received GEVs to produce the new
GEV for the message. We can derive the local encoding vectors
to produce the r1 linearly independent obfuscated GEVs, i.e.,
the rows of C1Θi,j,k, as follows.
Let Ω denote the r1×r1 dimensional local encoding matrix,
whose rows are the local encoding vectors. It should satisfy
ΩΛ = C1Θi,j,k. Since the matrix Θi,j,k is formed by the
obfuscate basis as its rows, it can be represented as Θi,j,k =
C2Λ, where C2 is a r1 × r1 dimensional matrix as follows:
C2 =

a1,1 · · · a1,r1
...
...
...
aN,1 · · · aN,r1
Ir1,L1
...
Ir1,Lr1−N

(according to Eq. (4)),
Algorithm 1 Local Encoding Matrix Computing
1: Find the maximum independent set of Vi,j,k and V˜i,j,k by Gaussian
elimination which are {α1, · · · , αr1} and {β1, · · · , βr2} respectively.
2: Construct a matrix A = {αT1 , · · · , α
T
r1
, βT1 , · · · , β
T
r2
} with dimension
h × (r1 + r2).
3: Compute row-echelon form matrix rref(A) by Gaussian elimination. Let
the number of non-pivotal columns of rref(A) be N .
4: for n from 1 to N do
5: θn =
r1∑
l=1
an,lαl where [an,1, · · · , an,h]
T is the nth non-pivotal
column of rref(A). The nth row of C2 is set to [an,1, · · · , an,r1 ].
6: end for
7: Ni,j,k =
N⋃
n=1
θn.
8: Find r1 − N vectors in Vi,j,k , {αL1 , · · · , αLr1−N
}, such that GEVs
in set {θ1, · · · , θN , αL1 , · · · , αLr1−N
} are linearly independent.
9: for n from 1 to r1 − N do
10: θN+n = αLn . The (N + n)th row of C2 is set to Ir1,Ln .
11: end for
12: The obfuscated basis of L(Vi,j,k) is Θi,j,k = {θ1, · · · , θr1}.
13: for l from 1 to r1 do
14: select l numbers from {1, · · · , q− 1} as the first l elements of the lth
row of matrix C1. The remaining r1 − l elements are set to 0.
15: end for
16: return local encoding matrix Ω = C1C2.
where Ir1,Ln is the Lnth row of a r1 × r1 identity matrix.
Since ΩΛ = C1Θi,j,k = C1C2Λ, we derive Ω = C1C2,
i.e., each row of C1C2 is a local encoding vector, which node
k should use to generate r1 independent obfuscated GEVs.
Let {m′1, · · · ,m
′
r1
} denote the r1 received coded messages
corresponding to the r1 linearly independent GEVs in Λ,
and M′ be the matrix formed by these coded messages as
its rows. The r1 linearly independent obfuscated new GEVs
{v′′1 , · · · ,v
′′
r1
} and the corresponding new coded messages
{m′′1 , · · · ,m
′′
r1
} can be calculated as follows: v
′′
1 m
′′
1
...
...
v′′r1 m
′′
r1
 = Ω
 α1 m
′
1
...
...
αr1 m
′
r1
 = [ ΩΛ ΩM′ ] .
Algorithm 1 shows to calculate the local encoding matrix. Let
f1 be the number of GEVs node k received from generation
j of flow i in the past T time slots and f2 be the number of
GEVs from other flows. Since the computational complexity of
Gaussian elimination applied to a m × n dimensional matrix
is O(mn min(m,n)) and that of matrix multiplication between
a m × n dimensional matrix and a n × l dimensional matrix
is O(mnl), the computational complexity of Algorithm 1 is
O(h2(f1 + f2)). To further calculate r1 new coded messages,
the total computational complexity is O(h2(f1 + f2) + r
2
1H).
Due to space limit, we omit the details.
At the source and destination. Our previous discussions
have been focusing on recoding at intermediate nodes to hide
relationship of its incoming and outgoing packets. We next
show that with a similar scheme, the source and destination
nodes of a flow can also hide themselves, as long as there are
other flows going through them.
A source node s of flow i can produce coded messages with
any GEVs from Fhq . If s also receives other flows, it can produce1012
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Fig. 3. ALNCode at the source node and the destination node.
obfuscated GEVs for generation j of flow i, using vectors from
L(V˜i,j,s). This is because vectors in L(V˜i,j,s) are linearly
correlated with the received GEVs from other flows, and they
are valid GEVs to produce coded messages at the source for
generation j of flow i. At the destination node d of flow i,
if some other flows go through it, it can generate obfuscated
GEVs for these other flows, exploiting the received GEVs from
flow i. In both cases, the anonymity of source and destination
nodes are protected, and an attacker can not distinguish whether
coded messages originate from or terminate at a node.
Fig. 3 gives an example, where solid directed lines denote
packets of generation j of flow i and dotted directed lines
denote packets of other flows. Let h = 3 and LNC is performed
over F3. At the source of flow i, a = [1, 1, 1],b = [2, 2, 0], c =
[2, 1, 0] are incoming GEVs from other flows. The source can
generate obfuscated GEVs such as d = 2b = [1, 1, 0], e =
a + 2b = [2, 2, 1], and f = a + b + c = [2, 1, 1]. At the
destination, o = [1, 2, 2],p = [0, 2, 1] are incoming GEVs from
generation j of flow i and m = [0, 2, 1],n = [1, 1, 0] are from
generation j′ of flow i′. The destination can generate obfuscated
GEVs for flow i′, such as g = m+n = o+2p = [1, 0, 1],h =
m + 2n = 2o = [2, 1, 1].
IV. EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS OF ALNCode
Using ALNCode, a node k which receives multiple flows
can effectively produce new coded messages for each outgoing
flow, with obfuscated GEVs against traffic analysis attacks, as
long as the condition of dim(L(Vi,j,k) ∩ L(V˜i,j,k)) 6= 0 is
satisfied. But does this condition hold with high probability in
practice? The answer to this question is crucial to the practical
effectiveness of our scheme, which we seek in the following.
In this section, we use L1 to denote L(Vi,j,k) and L2 to
denote L(V˜i,j,k), respectively, for simplified references. We
assume that the GEVs received by node k are randomly and
independently selected from finite field Fhq . In this case, L1 is a
span space of f1 vectors randomly selected from Fhq and L2 is
a span space of f2 vectors randomly selected from Fhq (Recall
that f1 and f2 are the numbers of GEVs received at k from
generation j of flow i and from other flows, respectively).
A. The Intersection Probability
We prove the lower bound of the probability dim(L1∩L2) 6=
0, for any f1 ≥ 0, f2 ≥ 0 (which is referred to as the
intersection probability), in Theorem 3.
Let
[
m
r
]
q
be the Gaussian binomial coefficient, i.e.,[
m
r
]
q
= (q
m−1)(qm−1−1)···(qm−r+1−1)
(q−1)(q2−1)···(qr−1) , 0 < r ≤ m. We set
[
m
0
]
q
= 1,∀m > 0. We first prove two lemmas.
Lemma 1: For any m × n dimensional matrix B whose
elements are randomly selected from finite field Fq, the prob-
ability that rank(B) = r, 0 ≤ r ≤ min(m,n) is given by:
p1(m,n, r, q) =
[
m
r
]
q
n∏
l=n−r+1
(ql − 1)q
r(r−1)
2 −mn.
Proof: From Theorem 1.10 in [20], the number of m× n
dimensional matrices with rank r, 0 ≤ r ≤ min(m,n)
is:
[
m
r
]
q
n∏
l=n−r+1
(ql − 1)q
r(r−1)
2 . Since the total num-
ber of m × n dimensional matrices is qmn, the proba-
bility that a m × n dimensional matrix has a rank of
r is

 m
r


q
n∏
l=n−r+1
(ql−1)q
r(r−1)
2
qmn
=
[
m
r
]
q
n∏
l=n−r+1
(ql −
1)q
r(r−1)
2 −mn.
From Lemma 1, we have p1(m,n, r, q) = p1(n,m, r, q).
Lemma 2: Given a vector space L1 with dim(L1) = r(r ≥
0), if L2 is a vector space spanned by f2 vectors randomly
selected from Fhq , the probability that dim(L1 ∩ L2) 6= 0 is:
p2(r, f2, h, q) ≥ 1−
min(f2,h−r)∑
g=0
p1(f2, h− r, g, q)q
(g−f2)r.
Proof: Given dim(L1) = r, let the basis of L1
be {v1, · · · ,vr}. Suppose the basis of Fhq extended by
{v1, · · · ,vr} is V = {v1, · · · ,vh}. Let V be the matrix
formed by vectors in V as its rows. Since matrix V is formed
by the basis of Fhq , for any vector v0 in F
h
q , there exists a
unique vector α in Fhq , such that v0 = αV.
A f2 × h dimensional matrix B is formed by f2 vectors
randomly selected in Fhq as its rows. We can express B as


α1,1 · · · α1,r α1,r+1 · · · α1,h
α2,1 · · · α2,r α2,r+1 · · · α2,h
...
...
...
...
...
...
αf2,1 · · · αf2,r αf2,r+1 · · · αf2,h




v1
v2
...
vh


= [ Λ1 Λ2 ]V, (5)
where Λ1 denotes a f2 × r dimensional matrix and Λ2 is
a f2 × (h − r) dimensional matrix. Since the first r rows of
V compose the basis of L1, the intersection of L1 and the
row space of matrix B (i.e., L2) is nonzero, iff there exists a
vector [b1, · · · , br][V]
r
1 in the row space of matrix B, where
[b1, · · · , br] 6= 0 and [V]
r
1 denotes a matrix formed by the set
of rows in V with indices from 1 to r. This is equivalent to that
dim(L1 ∩ L2) 6= 0, iff the row space of matrix
[
Λ1 Λ2
]
includes a nonzero vector [b1, · · · , br, 0, · · · , 0] of length h,
based on Eq. (5).
Since the f2 row vectors of B are randomly selected from
Fhq , the row vectors of matrix
[
Λ1 Λ2
]
are randomly
distributed in Fhq . Consequently, the probability of dim(L1 ∩
L2) 6= 0 equals to the probability that the row space of
matrix
[
Λ1 Λ2
]
, with randomly selected elements from1013
Fhq , includes a nonzero vector (b1, · · · , br, 0, · · · , 0) of length
h. The latter further equals to the probability that the row
space of the matrix
[
Λ2 Λ1
]
includes a nonzero vector
[0, · · · , 0, b1, · · · , br] of length h.
By Gaussian elimination, we can derive the row-echelon
form of matrix
[
Λ2 Λ1
]
, rref(
[
Λ2 Λ1
]
), which
has rank(
[
Λ2 Λ1
]
) non-zero rows. The column vec-
tors in
[
Λ2 Λ1
]
, those corresponding to columns in
rref(
[
Λ2 Λ1
]
) containing pivots, form the basis of the
column space of
[
Λ2 Λ1
]
. If the column space of Λ1
(i.e., L(ΛT1 )) is not a subspace of that of Λ2 (i.e., L(Λ
T
2 )),
then the basis of the column space of
[
Λ2 Λ1
]
must
contain at least one column vector from Λ1. Therefore, there
exists an index l where h − r < l ≤ h, such that the lth
column vector in rref(
[
Λ2 Λ1
]
) contains a pivot and the
corresponding row vector in rref(
[
Λ2 Λ1
]
) with that pivot
takes the form of [b′1, · · · , b
′
l−1, b
′
l, · · · , b
′
h] with b
′
n = 0 for
0 ≤ n ≤ l − 1 and b′l 6= 0. Since Gaussian elimination
equals to a series of elementary row operations, we derive
that the row space of
[
Λ2 Λ1
]
contains the nonzero vector
[b′1, · · · , b
′
l−1, b
′
l, · · · , b
′
h] with b
′
n = 0 for 0 ≤ n ≤ l − 1 and
b′l 6= 0. Therefore, if L(Λ
T
1 ) * L(Λ
T
2 ), then the row space
of matrix
[
Λ2 Λ1
]
includes a nonzero vector of length h
in the form of [0, · · · , 0, b1, · · · , br]. We thus know that the
probability of dim(L1 ∩ L2) 6= 0 is lower bounded by the
probability of L(ΛT1 ) * L(Λ
T
2 ), i.e.,
p2(r, f2, h, q) ≥ P (L(Λ
T
1 ) * L(Λ
T
2 ))
= 1− P (L(ΛT1 ) ⊆ L(Λ
T
2 )). (6)
Since the column vectors of Λ1 and Λ2 are randomly and in-
dependently selected from Ff2q , we derive P (L(Λ
T
1 ) ⊆ L(Λ
T
2 )):
min(f2,h−r)∑
g=0
P (rank(ΛT2 ) = g)P (L(Λ
T
1 ) ⊆ L(Λ
T
2 )|rank(Λ
T
2 ) = g). (7)
If rank(ΛT2 ) = g, then the number of vectors in L(Λ
T
2 ) is
qg . Therefore, when a vector is randomly selected from Ff2q ,
the probability that it is in L(ΛT2 ) is q
g−f2 . Given a vector
space L(ΛT2 ), we have L(Λ
T
1 ) ⊆ L(Λ
T
2 ) iff every row vectors
in ΛT1 is in L(Λ
T
2 ). Since the number of row vectors in Λ
T
1 is
r, the probability that every row vectors in ΛT1 is in L(Λ
T
2 ) is
q(g−f2)r, i.e.,
P (L(ΛT1 ) ⊆ L(Λ
T
2 )|rank(Λ
T
2 ) = g) = q
(g−f2)r.
From Lemma 1, P (rank(ΛT2 ) = g) = p1(h − r, f2, g, q) =
p1(f2, h− r, g, q). Therefore, Eq. (7) equals to
min(f2,h−r)∑
g=0
p1(f2, h− r, g, q)(
qg
qf2
)r.
Thus, p2(r, f2, h, q) ≥ 1−
min(f2,h−r)∑
g=0
p1(f2, h− r, g, q)q
(g−f2)r.
Now we prove the lower bound of the probability that
dim(L1 ∩ L2 6= 0) when L1 is a span space of f1 vectors
randomly selected from Fhq and L2 is a span space of f2 vectors
randomly selected from Fhq .
Theorem 3: Let L1 and L2 be span spaces of f1 and
f2 vectors randomly selected from Fhq , respectively, for any
h, f1, f2 ≥ 0 . The probability dim(L1 ∩ L2) 6= 0 satisfies:
P (dim(L1 ∩ L2) 6= 0)
≥
min(f1,h)∑
r=0
([
f1
r
]
q
h∏
l=h−r+1
(ql − 1)q
r(r−1)
2 −f1h
)
×1−min(f2,h−r)∑
g=0
[ f2
g
]
q
h−r∏
l=h−r−g+1
(ql − 1)q
g(g−1)
2 −f2h+gr
 .
Proof: From Lemma 1, the probability that dim(L1) =
r is p1(f1, h, r, q). From Lemma 2, when dim(L1) = r, the
probability that dim(L1∩L2) 6= 0 is p2(r, f2, h, q). Therefore,
P (dim(L1 ∩ L2) 6= 0) =
min(f1,h)∑
r=0
p1(f1, h, r, q)p2(r, f2, h, q)
≥ p3(f1, f2, h, q),
where the lower bound p3(f1, f2, h, q) is defined to be the term
in the right-hand side of the inequality in the theorem.
B. The Influential Parameters
To provide a better idea of the intersection probability
P (dim(L1 ∩ L2) 6= 0) with its deciding parameters, we show
the lower bound derived in Theorem 3 at different values
of f1, f2, h, and q in Fig. 4. Fig. 4 (a) and (b) show that
the probability increases with the increase of f1 and f2,
respectively. 1 The reason is straightforward: when h and q
are fixed, the more GEVs a node receives in the current flow
and in other flows, the larger probability the two vector spaces
L1 and L2 have nonzero intersection.
Fig. 4(c) shows that the probability decreases with the
increase of h, while Fig. 4(d) demonstrates different trends with
the increase of q in different cases. In particular, for ∀f1, f2 >
0, we show below with analysis that: when f1 + f2 ≤ h, this
lower bound probability decreases with the increase of q and
h; when f1 + f2 > h, it increases with the increase of q and
decreases with the increase of h.
If f1 + f2 ≤ h, from Lemma 1, the probability that the
(f1 +f2)×h dimensional matrix formed by the received GEVs
as its rows has full rank, is higher with larger q and h. When
the (f1 + f2) × h dimensional matrix has full rank, the f1 +
f2 GEVs are linearly independent (since f1 + f2 ≤ h), i.e.,
dim(L1∩L2) = 0. Thus, the intersection probability decreases
with the increase of q and h.
If f1+f2 > h, we use V1 to denote Vi,j,k and V2 to denote
V˜i,j,k. Let V3 =
[
V1
V2
]
. The analysis is shown below [21]:
dim(L1 ∩ L2) = dim(L(V1) ∩ L(V2))
= dim(L(V1)) + dim(L(V2))− dim(L(V1 ∪V2))
= rank(V1) + rank(V2)− rank(V3).
1Though not shown in the plots, we note that: in the case of Fig. 4(a), the
probability approaches 1 when f1 > 10; in the case of Fig. 4(b), the probability
goes to zero when f2 < 5 and approaches 1 when f2 > 15.1014
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Fig. 4. Lower bound of intersection probability P (dim(L1 ∩ L2)) 6= 0, when (a) f2 = 12, q = 2, h = 15; (b) f1 = 3, q = 2, h = 15; (c) f1 = 3, f2 =
12, q = 2; (d) h = 15.
If the f1 GEVs received from generation j of flow i are
linearly independent, and the f2 GEVs received from other
flows are linearly independent, then rank(V1) = min(f1, h),
rank(V2) = min(f2, h), and rank(V3) ≤ h. Then
dim(L1 ∩ L2) = rank(V1) + rank(V2)− rank(V3)
≥ min(f1, h) + min(f2, h)− h
> 0. (since f1 + f2 > h and f1, f2 > 0) (8)
Therefore, if the probabilities that V1 and V2 have full
ranks increase, the probability that dim(L(V1) ∩ L(V2)) > 0
increases. From Lemma 1, the former probabilities increase
with the increase of q and the decrease of h.
The above results can guide the practical selection of field
size (q), the number of messages per generation (h), and the
number of messages to buffer before recoding (f1) in ALNCode,
given the routes of flows decided by the routing protocol
(which determines f2). In general, an intermediate node may
buffer sufficient number of messages with linearly independent
GEVs in generation j of flow i to produce different new coded
messages. When dividing a flow into generations, a reasonably
small h should be chosen to guarantee a good intersection
probability, as well as low decoding complexity. The finite field
size q can then be set accordingly: if many linearly independent
GEVs can be received at each node such that f1 + f2 > h, a
relatively large q can be used, but not too large considering
the communication overhead and decoding complexity; if few
GEVs can be received, we can simply select q = 2 for the best
intersection probability.
V. DISCUSSIONS ON ANONYMITY AGAINST ATTACKS
We now discuss how the proposed ALNCode can practically
provide anonymity against traffic analysis attacks.
A traffic analysis attacker may try to identify the source,
destination, and the path of a flow by analyzing the correlation
among coded packets it observes. In a coded packet, the routing,
flow, and generation information are protected by the secure
routing protocol, and the attacker can only try to identify the
correlation among GEVs along the links.
We show the computational complexity for GEV correlation
analysis at each node the attacker eavesdrops on is very high
in ALNCode. Let the input GEVs at a node be {v1, · · · ,vF }
and an output GEV is v. To find the correlation between v
and all the input GEVs, the attacker needs to solve a system of
linear equations
∑F
l=1 xlvl = v, with F variables, x1, . . . , xF ,
and h equations. If dim(L(
⋃F
l=1 vl)) = R, F − R variables
are designated as free, i.e., they can take any value from Fq,
while the remaining variables are dependent on these free
variables. The dimension of the solution set is F −R. To solve
those equations, the attacker may first use Gaussian elimination
to find the F − R free variables and the linear dependence
among the R remaining variables and the free variables. The
computational complexity is O(Fh min(F, h))). After values of
the F −R free variables are given, the R remaining variables
can be calculated within O(R(F −R)) time. Since the number
of different value combinations of the F −R free variables is
qF−R, the computational complexity to find the solution set is
O(qF−R(Fh)). Therefore, the overall computational complex-
ity to analyze the linear correlation between one output GEV
and all input GEVs is O(Fh min(F, h)) + qF−RR(F − R)).
Note that R ≤ h. If the total number of GEVs received by
each node from different flows, F , is sufficiently large, the
computational complexity grows to infinite.
Even if the attacker obtains the correlation among upstream
and down stream GEVs at a node, the computational com-
plexity to trace the flow back (or forth) to the source (or
destination) grows exponentially, given that each output GEV
in ALNCode is correlated with multiple sets of input GEVs
with high probability. In a network with a large number of
nodes and flows, it is almost computationally impossible for an
attacker to correctly identify the source, destination, and paths
of a flow. Therefore, ALNCode is efficient to defend against
traffic analysis attacks and protect the anonymity of the source,
the destination, and the paths of each flow.
In addition, confidentiality of the message content can also
be protected in ALNCode from any outside attacker, since the
flow and generation information in each coded packet is hidden
by the secure, anonymous routing protocol. Even if an outside
attacker can acquire all the packets transmitted in the network,
it does not know which flow and generation coded packets
belong to, and thus cannot group packets belonging to the same
generation of a flow to decode the original messages.
VI. RELATED WORK
Network coding has been widely explored in recent years,
to achieve the maximum throughput of a network [3]–[5], as
well as to provide information security in a content distribution
network against active modification attacks and passive wire-
tapping attacks [6]–[11], [18]. With respect to defense against
wiretapping attacks, the main focus has been on exploring the
capability of network coding to provide confidentiality of the1015
message content [9]–[11]. Few efforts have been devoted to
utilizing network coding on communication anonymity.
The concept of anonymous communication between sources
and destinations was first introduced by Chaum et al. [12].
Among all attack models against anonymity, traffic analysis
attack is a major one. There exist a number of approaches on
defending anonymity against traffic analysis attack in traditional
networks without network coding, with three representative
ones: the Crowds approach, the onion routing approach, and
the Mix approach.
Crowds [22] provides a centralized service to randomly select
participants of a network into a group (the “crowd”), which
includes the source. Each message is routed through the crowd
before it is sent to the destination node, such that the attacker
cannot tell which node in the crowd is the original source. In the
onion routing approach [13], the source establishes a path to the
destination through a number of nodes called onion routers, and
encrypts the routing information and message repeatedly with
public keys of the onion routers, in order to prevent any attacker
from learning the path information. With the Mix approach
[14], [15], instead of forwarding each message as it arrives,
an intermediate node, i.e., the Mix node, waits for a random
period of time and then forwards messages it received in mixed
order, so as to hide the time correlation among messages of the
same flow. These existing approaches either require centralized
services, which is not scalable, or demands encryption of whole
messages, which is computationally expensive.
Among the few proposals which utilize LNC for anonymous
communication, we have discussed the work by Fan et al. [1]
and Zhang et al. [2] in Sec. I. Both approaches require central-
ized key distributed services for encryption and decryption of
the GEVs at source and destination, which limits the scalability
of the system. In contrast, we have shown that ALNcode
provides flow anonymity with low computational complexity
in a fully distributed manner.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper explores the power of linear network coding to
provide flow untraceability against traffic analysis attackers
in networks with multiple unicast flows. An effective LNC
mechanism, ALNCode, is proposed, that protects anonymity
of source, destination, and paths of each flow with a simple
but novel idea: nodes in the network mix the flow correlation
between downstream and upstream packets by generating GEVs
for outgoing coded messages from the common basis of incom-
ing GEVs belonging to multiple flows. A deterministic LNC
scheme is discussed in details that implements the idea. Other
highlights of our contributions include the solid and extensive
theoretical analysis on the existence condition of obfuscated
GEVs, the intersection probability of GEV bases, and the
complexity of our scheme, as well as abundant discussions
on practical settings of influential parameters for the best
effectiveness of our scheme.
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